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Controversies over the innateness of cognitive structures play a persistent role in driving 
research in philosophy as well as cognitive science, but the appropriate way to un­
derstand the category of the innate remains in dispute. The invariantist approaches of 
Stich and Sober face counterexample cases of traits that, though developing invariantly 
across different environments, nonetheless are not held by nativism partisans to count 
as innate. Appeals to canalization (Ariew) or to psychological primitiveness (Samuels) 
fail to handle this liberalism problem. We suggest a novel approach to innateness: 
closed process invariantism.
Controversies over the innateness of cognitive processes, mechanisms, and 
structures play a persistent role in driving research in philosophy as well 
as the cognitive sciences, but the appropriate way to understand the cat­
egory of the innate remains subject to dispute. One venerable approach 
in philosophy and cognitive science merely contrasts innate features with 
those that are learned. In fact, Jerry Fodor has recently suggested that 
this remains our best handle on innateness: “the polemical situation be­
tween rationalists and empiricists is really entirely symmetrical: nativism 
is merely the denial of empiricism insofar as we lack a way of saying what 
‘innate’ comes to other than not learned. Likewise, empiricism is merely 
the denial of nativism insofar as we lack a way of saying what ‘learned’
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comes to other than not innate” (Fodor 2001, 101; emphases in original). 
Tf Fodor is right, the concept of the innate is used merely as a placeholder, 
offering little illumination.
Unsatisfied with this answer, recent discussions of innateness have pur­
sued two alternative approaches to understanding the category of the 
innate. The first alternative (see Stich 1975; Ariew 1996, 1999; Sober 1998) 
identifies innateness with a sort of developmental invariance. The most 
basic form of invariantism holds that a trait will be innate to the extent 
that it would robustly develop in the face of wide variation in the envi­
ronment. Tf this approach could be applied to human cognition, it would 
have the advantage of offering a single account of innateness applicable 
across the study of the mind and biological development (Sober 1998). 
Unfortunately, as we discuss below, simple versions of invariantism appear 
too liberal to make sense of disputes in the empirical study of mind, as 
the approach seems to count a variety of learned or otherwise environ­
mentally acquired characteristics as innate (Ariew 1999; Samuels 2002). 
Andre Ariew (1999), however, has defended a canalization account of 
innateness that he claims successfully negotiates the problem of liberalism.
A second alternative to identifying the innate with the unlearned is 
provided by Richard Samuels’s (2002) recent defense of primitivism  as an 
account of innateness for the sciences of the mind. Primitivism, first sug­
gested by Fiona Cowie (1999) as an interpretation of Fodor’s nativism,1 
suggests that we understand as innate those structures or mechanisms 
lacking an explanation within psychology.2 On this account, the claim that 
a trait t is innate is what Cowie calls “an expression of metatheoretical 
gloom” (1999, x) regarding the prospects of a psychological explanation 
of the acquisition of the trait.
One aim of this article is critique. We argue that Ariew’s understanding 
of innateness as canalization and Cowie’s and Samuels’s primitivism are 
both fundamentally insufficient approaches that fail to articulate the dis­
tinctive theoretical role of innateness in the contemporary study of human 
cognition. Our second aim is constructive: we offer an alternative account 
of innateness that we think escapes the problems besetting these two 
accounts. Our aim in doing so is to identify what Richard Boyd has called 
a programmatic definition of innateness suited to the purposes of the cog­
nitive sciences, one that specifies a certain “inductive or explanatory role”
1. It is Samuels who labels the view ‘primitivism’. (Cowie offers several labels, including 
nonnaturalism [e.g., 1999, 64].)
2. Cowie suggests nonnaturalism as an interpretation of a number of historic and recent 
figures in philosophy and psychology, including Fodor. In contrast, Samuels’s aim is 
to offer a host of independent reasons for employing primitivism as the correct account 
of innateness for the cognitive sciences (Cowie 1999, 111; Samuels 2002, 248-250).
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that a term plays within a discipline (1999, 149). In this project, we join 
others we discuss, including Ariew (1996, 1999), Block (1981), Samuels 
(2002), Sober (1998), Stich (1975), and Wimsatt (1986, 1999). Just as they 
do, we draw upon a variety of resources—historical, conceptual, and 
empirical—to constrain and argue for a proposed account of innateness. 
Unlike Wimsatt (1999, 15-17), we do not feel particularly constrained by 
ordinary or folk intuitions about innateness. Such intuitions may be con­
fused (cf. Griffiths 1997, 59ff.) and, even if clear, may be of little relevance 
to ongoing discussions in the sciences of the mind. We will begin by briefly 
setting forth the invariantist and primitivist accounts in order to suggest 
what their respective shortcomings are and, thereby, to motivate our own 
account.
1. Invariantism. The core idea of invariance accounts is to identify the 
innateness of a trait with its stable development in diverse environments.3 
We can think of development as guided by processes such that:
(D J Organisms of type O develop traits of type T  in environment 
a.
Developmental generalizations like (D J do not require that any organism 
of type O has ever actually been in an a  environment but only that there 
be a fact to the m atter about what such an organism would have developed 
in such an environment.
Invariance accounts begin by identifying, for a given trait type and a 
given organism type, the set A of environments, such that we consider 
developmental outcomes in these environments relevant to whether or not 
a trait is innate. They then hold that:
(I) A trait of type T  is innate for an organism type O to the extent 
that (D J is true of T  and 0  in a larger proportion of the relevant 
environments in A.
3. We m ean for ‘tra it ' to  stand  in for a b roader class o f properties th a t an organism  
m ight have than  perhaps is custom ary within biology. F o r exam ple, on ou r usage, 
particular beliefs will count as traits. We needed a simple catchall w ord to  capture the 
wide range o f things that one can argue abou t being innate, and ‘tra it ' struck us as 
the best candidate. But we invite the reader to substitute ‘characteristic' o r ‘property ' 
for ‘tra it ' th roughout the rem ainder o f the text, should this usage seem untow ard. 
N othing in our discussion hangs on the terminology. (We are grateful to  Stephen 
Crowley for draw ing our a tten tion  to  this issue.)
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As others have noted (e.g., Ariew 1996, S25; Sober 1998, Section 1), 
such an approach makes innateness a matter of degree.4
L I .  The L iberalism  o f  Invariance A ccounts. The most serious objection 
(advanced by Ariew [1999] and Samuels [2002]) against simple invariance 
accounts is that they are too liberal. Tn particular, there are traits that 
develop in a stable manner across a variety of environments that current 
partisans on both sides of the innateness debate would categorize as ac­
quired.5 Samuels focuses on a case of belief: “it is very plausible to main­
tain that pretty much every human being acquires . . .  the belief that 
water is wet” (2002, 243). Ariew offers an alternative, nonpsycho- 
logical example: “Humans typically possess an abundant supply of a 
particular species of bacteria clostridium  difficile (c.d iff.) in our intestines. 
Humans are not born with c .d iff;  we typically acquire it by ingesting 
food and water . . .  so, intuitively, the possession of c.diff. is not innate. 
However, in the normal course of events humans eat and drink water and 
hence acquire c.diff. . . . Tt follows on Stich’s . . . [invariance] account, 
that c. diff. is an innate disease of the intestines. This is an unfortunate 
consequence of Stich’s account” (Ariew 1999,133)/’ Tn each of these cases, 
the trait in question develops invariantly across the range of typical en­
vironments, so simple invariance accounts are committed to counting each 
trait as innate. But Samuels and Ariew take it as obvious that the re­
spective traits are acquired.7 Tn joining them in this judgment, we reject 
the option of simply grouping such universally learned beliefs together 
with central examples of the innate (as in Wimsatt’s [1986] “generative
4. The idea is that developing across all the environments in A  would make T maximally 
innate. It is less clear how far away from that it needs to fall in order to count as 
maximally noninnate. Developing in none of the environments in A  is clearly too strong, 
since that really amounts to its being innate that the organism lacks the trait.
5. Note that in our usage the acquisition of a trait specifically rules out that trait's 
innateness, whereas the mere development of a trait is meant to  be agnostic on the 
trait's innate or noninnate status.
6. Ariew draws the example from Wendler (1996).
7. Relatedly, Samuels argues that simple invariance accounts misclassify the positions 
of paradigmatic psychological theorists, thereby failing to capture what is at stake in 
debates over the nature of mind. Samuels recalls Piaget's view that cognitive devel­
opment occurs in a series of stable developmental stages that are highly invariant and 
concludes that, on a simple invariance account, “Piaget would appear to be a nativist!” 
(2002, 245). Notice that this is another manifestation of the problem of liberalism. 
Any too-liberal account of innateness will misclassify theorists, for any theorist who 
endorses the existence of noninnate traits that are stably acquired in the course of 
development (be it the trait believing that water is wet or some Piagetian cognitive 
structure) thereby endorses an account of a trait as acquired that a simple invariance 
view would count as innate.
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entrenchment” approach). While such sangfroid may seem attractive to 
an invariantist, it renders the category of the innate too far removed from 
the concerns guiding research in cognitive science to be of interest. In 
what follows, we use both examples to fix our discussion, noting where 
they pull apart.8
1.2. Ariew, Canalization, and Liberalism. Ariew (1996, 1999) attempts 
to improve on the invariantist proposal by drawing on C. H. Waddington’s 
account of developmental canalization.9 He begins by offering the fol­
lowing diagnosis of invariantism’s liberalism problem:
Both Stich and Sober fail to recognize that there are two ways in which 
a trait emerges (invariantly) in a (e.g. normal) course of development, 
namely (both conditions come from Johnston 1988, 420):
(1) By means of strict genetic control over development so that the 
outcome of development is insensitive to the conditions under 
which it occurs. Such outcomes are said to be strongly canalized 
against environmental perturbation.
(2) By means of a developmental sensitivity only to environmental 
factors that are themselves invariant within the organism’s (e.g. 
normal) developmental environment. (134)
This diagnosis of simple invariantism strikes us as basically right: the 
simple invariance account fails because it pays no attention to the etiology 
of the emergence of phenotypic traits. Any account that improves over 
the Stich and Sober accounts must attend not just to under what circum­
stances the trait develops but by what processes it develops—not just the
8. We take it th a t these exam ples are no t folk in tu itions abou t cases but, rather, expert 
judgm ents on the pa rt o f players in the innateness debates. We take it th a t bo th  Samuels 
and Ariew agree w ith the constrain t imposed by such cases, though  bo th  pu t their 
poin t in conceptual term s th a t do  not illum inate the issue. As in the passage quoted 
in this paragraph, Ariew seems to hold an account o f innateness responsible to our 
in tu itions abou t such cases, though  elsewhere he takes these to  be constrained by certain  
theoretical desiderata (1996, S20-S21). Sam uels pursues the m ore felicitous route o f 
stipu la ting  th a t the concept innate  excludes learned traits, calling it the fu n d a m e n ta l  
conceptual constra in t (2002, 236).
9. Ariew (1996, 1999) speaks alm ost exclusively o f  canalization simpliciter, bu t one 
can distinguish two different kinds o f  canalization: environm ental and genetic can a­
lization. The form er refers to  developm ental robustness in the face o f  environm ental 
p ertu rba tions and seems to  be w hat Ariew has in m ind. (In his 1999 definition o f 
innateness, he m entions “environm ental canalization” only to drop  reference to it a 
m om ent later [1999, 128]). ‘G enetic canalization’ refers to  developm ental robustness 
in the face o f genetic m utation .
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‘when and where’ but also the ‘how’ of acquisition. The question arises, 
then, as to what resources Ariew might bring to bear so as to avoid 
suffering the same fate as simple invariantism. He suggests that canali­
zation will allow him to make the necessary distinction, as indicated by 
how he continues the above passage: “The second outcome is not canalized 
in Waddington’s sense but is invariant under the normal conditions of 
development. . . . Although the outcome is invariant it is acquired, not 
innate and not canalized” (1999, 135). Ariew’s strategy is thus to identify 
innateness with canalization, where “the degree to which a developmental 
pathway is canalized is the degree to which development of a particular 
endstate (phenotype) is insensitive to a range of environmental conditions 
under which the endstate emerges” (128). Ariew's preceding discussion 
introduces the idea of development, which is sensitive to various envi­
ronmental parameters over the course of development. He concludes that 
“the more sensitive to the environmental conditions the developmental 
system is, the less inclined we are to say that the developmental endstate 
is canalized” (134). His idea, we take it, is that the development of a trait 
is more or less insensitive to environmental perturbation, and this degree 
of insensitivity ju s t is canalization or innateness.
Yet, so far, this adds little to the simple invariance account. While he 
claims that traits produced by an invariant environment are not “canalized 
in Waddington’s sense,” it is hard to see how the account of canalization 
Ariew provides is any improvement over, for example, Sobers simple 
invariance thesis that identifies phenotypic traits developing “in all of a 
range of developmental environments” as innate (1998,795). For the traits 
that provoke the concern that invariance accounts are too liberal, it is 
true to say that they develop in a way that is “insensitive to a range of 
environmental conditions under which the endstate emerges,” apparently 
satisfying Ariew's account of canalization. Ariew has correctly diagnosed 
the source of the liberalism problem, but he has not solved it.10
While Ariew is not clear about how he thinks Waddington’s account 
of canalization might address the problem of liberalism, we can think of 
two lines of solution he might pursue, turning on different ways of un­
derstanding Ariew's phrase “strict genetic control.”11 First, one might 
think that a solution lies in the idea that the development of some traits 
are under more direct genetic control than that of other traits; the former, 
but not the latter, are innate. However, there are at least two problems
10. Because our claim  here is th a t A riew 's (1996, 1999) account is incom plete, it is 
open to  him  to  develop his account in ways th a t address the liberalism  problem  m ore 
explicitly, perhaps in line with the options we suggest here o r alternatively in the spirit 
of our own proposal below.
11. This language comes from  Johnston  (1988).
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with this approach. First, the obvious way to make sense of such genetic 
control is via the notion of causal invariance.12 This is, for example, the 
way Johnston (1988, 419^20) seems to have understood the idea, dis­
tinguishing characteristics that are strictly under control from those that 
are not by reference to whether the trait develops in the face of environ­
mental perturbation.13 On construals such as those, however, the notion 
of a genetically controlled trait simply collapses back into a simple version 
of an invariantly produced trait, without providing any help in distin­
guishing invariant outcomes that are canalized from those that are not. 
We thus have no solution to the problems facing simple invariance ac­
counts advocated by Stich and Sober. There is also reason to be skeptical 
that any account of strict genetic control is forthcoming, since every de­
velopmental process exploits multiple genetic and nongenetic resources. 
In addition, it remains unclear what genes are such that they might figure 
in genetic control. To choose just one complication, a single DNA coding 
sequence can (via alternative splicing) produce multiple proteins, prob- 
lematizing the gene concept itself (Downes 2004; see also Stotz, Griffiths, 
and Knight 2004) and, along with it, the notion o f ‘genetic control’. These 
reasons look to us to be reason enough to think that invoking genetic 
control offers no improvement over simple invariance accounts.
If the idea of genetic control cannot do the work Ariew needs, then 
perhaps it is the idea of the strictness of the invariance that he thinks can 
distinguish the truly canalized from the merely invariant. So perhaps an­
other candidate solution for invariance approaches is to extend the range 
of environments under consideration. That is, perhaps we can extend our 
analysis of development beyond normal developmental environments and 
consider possible environments across the course of development in which 
traits would not occur.
Expanding the set A of relevant environments will typically result in a 
shrinking of the number of innate traits (or in a shrinking of the degree 
of innateness of most traits) because fewer traits will develop across the 
range of relevant environments (or will develop in a smaller number of 
them). So, for example, we might evaluate the innateness of the trait 
believing that water is wet by whether it develops in environments in which 
a person is never exposed to water but is fed entirely on, say, orange juice. 
If such an environment is considered relevant (and thereby included in
12. There m a y  be a  direct no tion  of “ genetic con tro l” if one takes genes to  simply be 
segments o f D N A  (though see below) and restricts oneself to  ta lk  of, e.g., the  synthesis 
of proteins. But clearly th a t no tion  will no t be able to  underw rite speaking o f genes 
causing, say, such tra its  as having  a language acquisition device.
13. Sober (2000), in a  similar but slightly different vein, construes genetic causation  
in term s o f norm s o f reaction.
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A), then the belief will be relatively less innate than if we evaluate its 
development only in actual environments. (Presumably, the person would 
not develop the trait believing that water is wet because that person would 
fail to develop the concept water.) Call a theory that expands the relevant 
range of environments from relatively normal environments to possible- 
even-if-wildly-unlikely ones ‘wide invariantism’.
Unfortunately, wide invariantism faces severe difficulties of its own. 
For starters, remember that, on an invariantist account, innateness is a 
matter of degree. So adding in the orange juice environment might succeed 
in rendering the trait believing that water is wet not 100% innate— but it 
still turns out to be very, very, very innate. Yet we expect that partisans 
on both sides would take such traits to be very noninnate on the grounds 
that, ex hypothesi, they arise from a learning process. Indeed, we would 
have thought that it is as noninnate as such similarly acquired but clearly 
variant traits as believing that the number five  bus goes to Parley’s Way 
or believing that it is a good idea to keep six cats in a studio apartment in 
the East Village. If this is right, merely expanding the range of relevant 
environments does not succeed in solving the problem posed by traits like 
believing that water is wet.
Wide invariantism faces a baby-and-bathwater problem too: even if a 
wider range of relevant environments could get rid of paradigm-acquired 
traits like believing that water is wet, it might also thereby get rid of 
paradigm -innate traits like having 10 fingers and 10 toes. This latter trait, 
while paradigmatically innate in humans, does not develop in circum­
stances that include thalidomide in the prenatal environment. And we do 
not see any principled way for wide invariantists to specify a range of 
environments relevant to assessing innateness that would allow them to 
include, for example, the orange juice environment but not a prenatal- 
thalidomide environment. The former, after all, is purely fictional, as is 
any no-water environment consistent with the organism’s developing at 
all; the latter is an environment that unfortunately has been actually 
instantiated.
There may be other possible fixes for invariantism, but both genetic 
control and wide invariantism are not up to the job. Following Ariew’s 
own diagnosis, we can see that neither proposed fix successfully makes 
use of the etiology of traits in order to help separate the innate from the 
invariantly acquired. The diagnosis thus motivates turning our attention 
to a recent and very etiology-oriented account of innateness: primitivism.
2. Primitivism. As we saw above, Samuels is sharply critical of invariance 
accounts. In their stead, he offers a radically different account of innate­
ness. The core of Samuels’s alternative view converges with a strand of 
Cowie’s (1998) exegesis of the history of the innateness concept: the view
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that a psychological structure is innate just in case it is a psychological 
primitive. To a first approximation, this means that innate traits are those 
for which there is no psychological account of their development, and 
acquired traits are those whose acquisition is explicable in psychological 
terms. Cowie and Samuels both think that their view captures an im­
portant concept of innateness used in contemporary cognitive science by 
Jerry Fodor, among others. And to the extent that Cowie and Samuels 
are correct in their exegetical claims that innateness understood as prim­
itivism is an important, operative concept at work in contemporary (and 
perhaps historical) cognitive science, then Samuels’s defense of primitivism 
is also a defense of this tradition. To the extent their exegetical claims are 
correct, our critique of primitivism is an attack on a certain way of using 
and thinking about innateness in contemporary cognitive science. But we 
also think that those claims are false—our account of innateness gives a 
better understanding of how that term functions in the literature. We 
begin by setting out Samuels’s defense of primitivism and highlighting 
several features. We then go on to critique Samuels’s account.
2.1. Defining Primitivism. So, what is it for a psychological structure 
to be a psychological primitive? A psychological structure S  is a psycho­
logical primitive, according to Samuels, if and only if two conditions are 
met: S  is a structure posited by some correct scientific psychological theory 
and there is no correct scientific psychological theory that explains the 
development of S  (2002, 246). On Samuels’s view, therefore, being a psy­
chological primitive is an explanatory notion: “to say that a cognitive 
structure S is primitive is to claim that, from  the perspective o f  scientific 
psychology, S needs to be treated as one whose [development] has no 
explanation” (246). Samuels emphasizes the failure of explanation within 
scientific psychology because he wants to leave open the possibility that 
explanations of the relevant structure might be possible within other 
(lower-level) sciences, “e.g. neurobiology or molecular biology” (246). 
Primitivism allows us to understand disputes regarding nativism in the 
cognitive sciences as disputes over whether the development of particular 
psychological mechanisms, a set of such mechanisms, or the preponder­
ance of such mechanisms can be explained within scientific psychology.
This account of innateness employs the notion of an explanation within 
scientific psychology to do the work of distinguishing between the innate 
and the acquired, a point to which we return shortly. For now, let us note 
that Samuels is clear that he does not mean for the category of innate to 
be coextensive with those structures lacking a developmental explanation 
within current scientific psychology. Rather, he means that a structure is 
innate for which “there is no such theory to be discovered” (2002, 246, 
note 20) or, to put it another way, that even a completed scientific psy­
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chology—a psychological theory that has discovered all the psychological 
acquisition explanations there are to be discovered—will not explain the 
development of the structure.
2.2. Why Primitivism? Why might primitivism be an attractive account 
of innateness? Samuels suggests a variety of advantages to his approach, 
but we will emphasize two. First, it both explains and advances the ven­
erable philosophical approach that closely associates the innate with the 
unlearned. Tt explains the intuitions governing this approach, since for t 
to be learned is, on a primitivist account, for us to have a learning—and 
thus psychological—explanation of f’s development. By contrast, it ad­
vances the approach by allowing that there may be psychological processes 
of acquisition beyond those identified by traditional empiricist learning 
models.
A second advantage is that, as noted, primitivism focuses on etiology 
in a way that may allow it to avoid the invariantist’s problem of liberalism. 
Beliefs like water is wet acquired through learning processes will have 
explanations (namely, learning explanations) within a complete scientific 
psychology, so primitivism counts them as acquired, not innate.14
2.3. The Need fo r  Normal Development. So far, primitivism clearly 
looks radically different from invariantism. But this radical difference is 
soon moderated as Samuels supplements his account of innateness in order 
to deal with a certain class of problematic cases. These cases all involve 
the acquisition of a psychological structure via a patently nonpsycho- 
logical process (i.e., one without a psychological explanation). For ex­
ample, Samuels supposes that one could acquire knowledge of Latin by 
taking a ‘Latin pill’.15 “By hypothesis . . .  the causal cascade initiated by 
ingesting the pill does not have a psychological description, but works 
by reorganizing the underlying neurochemistry of the brain” (Samuels 
2002, 257). The problem posed by such a case (and other more realistic 
examples [257ff.]) is clear: the primitivism we have been considering clas­
14. F o r sim ilar reasons, psychologists like Piaget w ho endorse an  account o f the psy­
chological acquisition of a  psychological structure thereby count as nonnativ ist on the 
prim itivist account (see note 7). But note th a t prim itivism ’s victory here is no t complete. 
F o r while it handles the m ost troubling cases o f liberalism  for the cognitive sciences, 
it does no t even try  to  handle nonpsychological cases like A riew ’s exam ple o f  C. d iff. 
This bacterium , as noted earlier, is widely acquired by norm al consum ption  of food 
and water. Possession of C. d iff. is a  parad igm  acquired trait, bu t it does no t have a 
psycho log ica l acquisition explanation. Sam uels’s account, for better or for worse, a b an ­
dons the prospect o f a  unified account o f innateness across biology and the cognitive 
sciences.
15. The exam ple is from  F o d o r (1975, 34).
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sifies such knowledge of Latin as innate, and such a result is problematic 
since it is common ground that in such a case the knowledge of Latin is 
acquired. Primitivism therefore faces a liberalism problem of its own.
One might think, given that invariantism’s problems arose from insuf­
ficient attention to etiology, that a primitivist like Samuels would want 
to fix this problem by tweaking his own appeal to etiology, for example, 
by broadening the set of processes such that, if they produce a trait, the 
trait cannot be considered innate. But instead, surprisingly, Samuels tacks 
in the direction of invariantism! He attempts to handle such cases by 
adding a separate necessary condition on innateness that requires that an 
innate structure appear in the normal course o f  development. He suggests 
a Normalcy Condition:
A (token) cognitive structure possessed by an organism O is innate
only if O would acquire S . . . in the normal course of events. (2002,
259)16
Such a condition excludes cases like the Latin Pill, for such knowledge 
acquisition is not part of the normal course of events. Samuels does not 
offer us much guidance here about how to understand the notion of 
normal development, apparently because he realizes the issue is compli­
cated and does not think the details m atter much. He later suggests that 
the idea is related to “species typical patterns of development” (262) but 
says little else.
Like Samuels, we do not much want to wrangle over the details of 
normal development. However, without any further explanation, the con­
dition looks ad hoc, designed only to address counterexamples to prim­
itivism. Samuels offers little independent motivation for why such a con­
dition is part of innateness or how it coheres with primitivism. We suspect 
that Samuels is relying on the intuitive plausibility of relating normal 
development and innateness. But notice that this same plausibility drives 
invariance accounts of innateness as well. Invariance accounts hold that 
a trait is innate only if it arises in a (perhaps pragmatically identified) 
broad range of environments. Invariance accounts do not have trouble 
with Latin Pills precisely because such pills do not figure in the production 
of invariant psychological structures across a broad range of environ­
ments. Very few environments have such pills in them! Requiring a ‘normal 
course of development’ condition addresses such problems in precisely 
the same way, by simply specifying the range of environments in which 
development counts in determining the degree of innateness.
To summarize, Samuels’s account, which is offered as an alternative to
16. It seems clear that Samuels does not want to put much weight on the details of 
this condition, writing that it is an “instance” of the sort of condition one might add.
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invariance accounts, is actually something of a hybrid, holding that a 
token psychological structure S  is innate if and only if
(i) S is a structure posited by some correct scientific psychological 
theory, and there is no correct scientific psychological theory that 
explains the acquisition of S (explanatory primitivism condition); 
and
(ii) S would arise in the course of normal development (normalcy 
condivation).
Tn Section 3, we argue that despite its considerable charms, primitivism 
is not the right account of innateness for the cognitive sciences.
3. Critiquing Primitivism. Primitivism suffers from at least two critical 
flaws. First, primitivism needlessly confuses the epistemology of psycho­
logical theorizing with the metaphysics of mechanisms of acquisition. 
Second, the distinction between psychological and nonpsychological ac­
quisition explanations is obscure, only recreating the problems with the 
innate/learned distinction we left behind.
The primitivism condition is a peculiar condition to impose on innate 
structures, precisely because, as Samuels notes, it is an explanatory con­
straint. Tt is an epistemological rather than a metaphysical condition on 
a psychological structure. We are as optimistic as Samuels that correct 
theories are a wonderful guide to how the world is (what better guide 
could there be?), but it is odd to define putatively objective aspects of the 
world in terms of explanation. Paradigmatic scientific properties such as 
charge, spin, mass, cell, respiration, and so forth are not understood in 
terms of explanations, and it strikes us as implausible that the concept 
innate should be so understood. We would have thought that innateness 
was a property of structures, traits, processes, or mechanisms that could 
be characterized independently of the varieties and levels of explanation 
that theorists do or could apply to them.
Tt is possible to recast Samuels’s proposal in objective terms. We can 
do this by applying the predicates “psychological” and “nonpsychologi- 
cal” to the processes o f  developmen t themselves rather than of our expla­
nations of those processes. Primitivism thus recast would hold that innate 
psychological structures are structures that are psychological (where this 
means figuring in lawlike psychological regularities), but which are not 
developed by a psychological process. Thus, we can distinguish between 
primitivism,, (Samuels’s original proposal) and primitivism,,, (our amend­
ment to that proposal):
A token psychological structure S  is innate if and only if
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(i) S  is not acquired by a psychological process (metaphysical prim ­
itivism condition)', and
(ii) S  arises in the course of normal development (normalcy condi­
tion).
Primitivism^ abandons one of the distinctive features of Samuels’s for­
mulation, but if we are right, it is better off abandoned.
This way of presenting primitivism also makes very clear that it (either 
in its original or metaphysicalized form) rests squarely on the shoulders 
of a distinction between psychological and nonpsychological explana­
tions, processes, or mechanisms. But dialectically, it looks as though 
this reliance simply replaces the obscure learned/innate distinction with 
the equally obscure psychological/nonpsychological distinction. We have 
been happy to follow Samuels (and, e.g., Fodor 1975, 1981) in identi­
fying the category of learning with specific sorts of psychological ac­
quisition processes and in recognizing a superordinate category of psy­
chological acquisition to pick out a larger group of relevant acquisition 
processes. But this will am ount to substantial progress in understanding 
innateness only if we can give the psychological/nonpsychological dis­
tinction some determinate content. We cannot simply allow the terms 
to figure as bare unanalyzed placeholders, for that is precisely the cir­
cumstance, with respect to the innate/learned distinction, that we are 
hoping to leave behind.
How could we give the distinction between the psychological and the 
nonpsychological more content? W hat is it that a finished psychological 
science will be about? Put semantically, what is the meaning of “psycho­
logical”? There are some well-established pathways through the forest 
here, but we are not sure that they end up where we want to be. For 
example, one tradition in the philosophy of mind identifies psychological 
entities with the referents of folk psychological terms, where we under­
stand these referents as being determined by the common beliefs com­
prising a fo lk  psychological theory (e.g., Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson 
1996). Tn line with this tradition, we could simply identify finished scientific 
psychological theories as being complete theories regarding the entities of 
folk psychology.
Unfortunately, there are serious problems with such a reliance on folk 
psychology. First, many people, and perhaps most famously Daniel Den­
nett (1987), argue that folk psychology is a predictive and explanatory 
instrument without commitments to the specific metaphysical facts of the 
brain in virtue of which it is successful. According to this instrumentalist 
view, the apparent objects of folk psychology—beliefs, desires, intentions, 
and so forth—are “abstracta rather than part of the ‘furniture of the 
physical world’” (Dennett 1987, 72). Tf this view is right, then it is not
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clear that folk psychology identifies entities that can then form the subject 
matter of a finished scientific psychology.
Second, a problem with this proposal is that, as Paul Churchland (1981) 
has argued, the boundaries of psychology as established by folk psy­
chology also look to exclude a great many phenomena that are both 
interesting and within the purview of the scientific study of the mind/ 
brain as it is currently understood. And one need not share Churchland’s 
skepticism about the value of folk psychology to agree that there are a 
great many phenomena of interest to the sciences of the mind that do not 
figure in our folk psychology of beliefs, desires, and the like.
Instead of relying on folk psychology to identify the entities that interest 
us, we could shift from folk psychology to scientific psychology and use 
scientific theories to identify the entities about which a completed science 
of psychology is needed. Unfortunately, this simply pushes the bump in 
the carpet. Whereas before we hoped to look at folk psychology to identify 
the subject m atter of scientific psychology, we now need to identify those 
scientific theories or researchers that are genuinely psychological. And 
how are we to do that? It might be thought that we can use contemporary 
disciplinary boundaries as institutionalized in academic and professional 
psychology to draw the relevant distinctions, but we are skeptical. We see 
no reason to think that those researchers and theories identified as psy­
chological by contemporary institutional boundaries of scholarship and 
industry share a common subject matter. Rather, it is obvious that dis­
ciplinary and institutional boundaries are evolving and intellectually po­
rous and cannot ground the kind of distinction that we need. The openness 
of the category of the psychological is revealed by the rapid increase in 
the number of centers for cognitive science, representing a confederacy 
that includes not just psychology but also such fields as linguistics, phi­
losophy, neurology, computer science, and anthropology. The recently 
developing field of cognitive neuroscience lies right on the vague border 
between the psychological and the biological. Moreover, disciplinary 
boundaries can expand to chase their explananda, so what can appear to 
be a chapter of purely biological neurology one day can become part and 
parcel of psychology the next, should the structures involved prove of 
psychological—and, in particular for our purposes here, developmental 
psychological—interest. The psychological/nonpsychological distinction is 
simply too weak a branch upon which to rest the concept of innateness.17
17. It is w orth no ting  th a t to the extent Sam uels sim ply stipulates borders for psy­
chology, to th a t extent his proposal will fail to  have the kind o f program m atic neutrality  
he claims for it. Samuels writes th a t “disputes between behaviorists and cognitivists 
and between connectionists and classical com putational theorists have, in large part, 
concerned” the “correct fram ew ork within which to form ulate scientific psychological
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A more promising option for Samuels is to identify the psychological 
with a certain sort of natural kind or set of kinds. All Samuels needs to 
ground the distinction is that the boundary between the psychological 
and nonpsychological be objective, not that we know currently what the 
boundary is. Samuels could take the referent of the psychological to be 
the natural kind, whatever it is, that underlies key phenomena associated 
with the use of the term ‘psychological’. As contemporary semantic ex­
ternalists have argued, perhaps we can carve nature at its joints without 
knowing exactly what those joints are.
But is it at all plausible to think that such a kind underlies psychology? 
Call membership in such a kind a natural criterion for psychology. What 
might such a criterion look like? The only existing proposal that seems 
remotely plausible to us for such a kind is the possibility, suggested in 
the works of classical cognitive scientists (e.g., Fodor 1975, 1981; Newell 
and Simon 1976; Haugeland 1981; Pylyshyn 1986), that psychological 
phenomena may be explained by manipulations of internal symbols oc­
curring at a distinct level of explanation. For example, Newell and Simon 
famously defend the “Physical Symbol System Hypothesis,” holding that 
“a physical symbol system has the necessary and sufficient means for 
general intelligent action” (1976, 116). We are very sympathetic to this 
classical approach to the study of cognition, as one significant piece of 
the overall psychological story; however, we do not think that it can 
underwrite a distinction between psychological and nonpsychological phe­
nomena of the sort primitivism needs. Moreover, we think its inability 
even to begin to define the cognitive suggests that no natural criterion is 
available to do the work Samuels requires.
The cogency of the classical approach to cognition has been sharply 
attacked on numerous grounds, but we will not address those here, fo­
cusing instead on attacks on the completeness of the classical approach. 
Such attacks suggest that even if some cognitive processes are underwritten 
by a symbolic architecture, it is wildly implausible to assume that they 
all are. Rather, a variety of explanatory paradigms, including connec- 
tionism (e.g., McClelland and Rumelhart 1986; Rumelhart and Mc­
Clelland 1986; Sejnowski and Rosenberg 1986, 1987), dynamic systems 
(van Gelder 1995), and situated/embedded cognition (Hutchins 1995; 
Clark 2003), offer explanations of some seemingly intelligent behaviors
theories” (2002, 252). But, Samuels argues, “ it w ould be a m istake to  incorporate a 
substantive account o f  scientific psychology in to  the prim itivist account o f  nativism ” 
(252) because this w ould m ake determ ination  o f  the  right program m atic definition o f 
innateness hostage to  far m ore sweeping research program s instead o f allowing it to  
play a role in fixing and contrasting  the  em pirical claims o f  such program s. Insofar as 
prim itivism  rem ains silent on the specific character o f psychology, it offers this kind 
o f program m atic neutrality.
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that do not appear to require an internalized symbolic language of thought 
for their production. The moral of these research programs, and the others 
that will no doubt follow, is that there are numerous, heterogeneous ways 
to solve cognitive/behavioral problems, of which a symbolic architecture 
is only one. If the mind/brain ultimately employs heterogeneous mecha­
nisms, then classical approaches to cognition will fail for the same reason 
Churchland attacked folk psychology: there would be important mental 
phenomena that fall outside the scope of the theory.
The possible incompleteness of the symbolic story suggests a more 
general failure as well. A ny  heterogeneous approach to explanatory mech­
anisms (and such an approach is accepted even by many sympathetic to 
symbolic representations [e.g., Sterelny 1990, Chapter 8]) undermines our 
chances of finding the needed natural criterion. So, the strategy of at­
tempting to find a natural criterion to ground the needed psychological/ 
nonpsychological distinction turns out to rely on a substantial (and we 
think implausible) empirical assumption: that there is such a criterion to 
be had.
We thus see that primitivism, despite its initial attractions, is forced to 
rest too much theoretical weight on the distinction between the psycho­
logical and the nonpsychological. One might be able to draw such a 
distinction in institutional terms, though we doubt it. But it is clear that 
one will not be able to draw the distinction firmly where really one would 
have to for primitivism to succeed—out in the world.
4. Beyond Invariantism and Primitivism. Thus far, we have argued against 
the two main extant accounts of innateness. Invariantist accounts are too 
liberal, and this results from their indifference to the actual processes or 
mechanisms that give rise to the traits in question. Ariew’s (1999) defense 
of canalization recognizes this but fails to formulate an account of in­
nateness that rectifies the problem. And Samuels’s primitivism is wrong­
headed, relying as it does on an epistemological rather than metaphysical 
conception of innateness and requiring an unsustainably robust psycho- 
logical/nonpsychological distinction. Despite their apparent (and real) dif­
ferences, Ariew’s invariantism and Samuels’s primitivism share a deeper 
set of similarities. Both theories are at heart ‘invariance-plus’ accounts 
that try to fix simple invariantism’s liberalism problem by appealing to 
something about the etiology of traits: canalization for Ariew and psy­
chological primitiveness for Samuels. But in both cases the additional 
condition—the ‘plus’ factor—failed the task set for it. Nonetheless, we 
think that the attention Ariew and Samuels pay to etiology is entirely 
warranted, and we follow them in pursuing the invariance-plus strategy. 
Our claim is that for a trait to be innate, it must normally be invariantly 
acquired and must not have been acquired by means o f  a process that
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normally produces variant traits. W hat distinguishes the cases that cause 
trouble for the invariance account is that they involve open developmental 
processes in systematically invariant environments. So we want to exclude 
these cases from the innateness category.
First, let us give a more precise account of the open/closed distinction. 
Any developmental process has some range of traits in which it can even­
tuate, and the openness or closedness of the process corresponds to how 
diverse that range is. Tt is not just that the process eventuates in a large 
number of traits, since presumably the process that gives us 10 fingers 
and 10 toes also gives us lots of other more particular traits about the 
particular arrangement and structure of each of those digits, inter prob­
ably many alia. Tt is important also that the process is producing different 
traits in accord with which environments in which the organism is 
developing.
For example, if we assume that Noam Chomsky is basically correct, 
then the human language acquisition device (LAD) can produce any of 
an extremely diverse set of linguistic competences, depending on what 
linguistic community in which the organism finds itself. The LAD thus 
is a fairly open process. But the process, for any given person, by which 
they develop their basic bodily map is much more highly constrained. 
These developmental processes are difficult to disrupt, but disrupting these 
processes has a much narrower range of outcomes. Tf one goes to an 
environment that is sufficiently extreme, one may find that it does not 
support the development of two arms, two legs, two kidneys, and so forth, 
in their usual locations. The reason is almost always because it will not 
support the development of arms or legs or kidneys at all—and not un­
usual cardinalities of organs, or organs in problematic locations. Tf the 
environment supports the functioning of such processes at all, the process 
is extremely fixed in its outcomes. We thus say that these are very closed 
processes. Many processes may lie in between such extremes; the process 
by which we have a certain degree of muscle in our arms, for example, 
can give significantly varying outcomes depending on such environmental 
factors as nutrition and exercise, but only within a fairly specific range.
Our account thus holds that a trait t is innate in an organism O to the 
extent that
(i) O would develop t across the range of normal environments (in­
variance condition);18 and
18. As Sam uels (2002) notes, it is no t clear how to  in terpret norm al, and  different 
theorists m ay wish to  in terpret this condition  in different ways. W hile we view the 
exact specification o f the condition  as indeterm inate, we know  o f no cases in  which a 
theorist has insisted th a t a  tra it is innate  th a t would no t develop across a  b road  range 
of actual environm ents.
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(ii) The proximal cause of O ’s development of t is by a closed process 
or processes (closed process condition).
To illustrate the account, consider how it applies to sex determination. 
In humans, the development of phenotypic sexual features is typically 
determined by the chromosomes each of us receives. It then typically 
develops invariantly via closed processes. It therefore counts as innate. 
But in other species, notably many reptiles, phenotypic sexual character­
istics are determined in part by the temperature at which the eggs are 
incubated (see, e.g., Ayling and Griffin 2002). In these species, the process 
that gives rise to phenotypic sex may well be closed given that it results 
in relatively few phenotypic outcomes across a range of environments, 
but phenotypic sex would not count as innate because the sex of each 
organism does not develop invariantly across a wide range of environ­
ments—in those environments in which the temperature is different, the 
sex is different.
5. Closed Process Invariance and Liberalism. Where Ariew has invoked a 
distinction between canalized and noncanalized development, and Samuels 
a distinction between psychological and nonpsychological explanations, 
we rely on a distinction between open and closed processes. We thus need 
to take some time here to argue both that the resulting account is immune 
to the charge of liberalism (and thus succeeds in improving over simple 
invariantism) and that our preferred distinction has no undischarged or 
intractable theoretical commitments (and thus succeeds in improving over 
both Ariew and Samuels).
We begin with the charge of liberalism. Importantly for our account, 
traits like believing that water is wet are (by hypothesis) produced by an 
extremely open process, namely, general learning.19 Learning can produce 
an indefinitely large set of traits, for example, all of the various beliefs 
that any person might develop given some set of inputs from the envi­
ronment. Thus learning is a decidedly open process, and any trait it pro­
duces will not be counted as innate by our account.20 W hat about the
19. It is unproblematic for us if ‘general learning' turns out to name more a family 
of processes than any one process; see below.
20. It is worth noting that our account provides exactly the sort of distinction needed 
to handle certain examples from classical philosophical debates over innateness. Em­
piricists like John Stuart Mill argue that the appearance of necessity could arise as a 
result o f experience. For example, he writes “that the same proposition cannot at the 
same time be false and true. . . .  I consider it to be, like other axioms, one of our first 
and most familiar generalizations from experience” (Logic , bk. II. c. vii. § 4). The idea, 
as in the water is wet case, is that a belief could be acquired invariantly from experience, 
but the empiricist explains the belief by reference to  an open process o f acquisition
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case of c. diff! It seems that the process by which the trait of being 
inhabited by c. diff. is simply the process of ingestion, which can produce 
a large variety of traits. Just consider all the different things—from the 
benign to the pathogenic—that one might ingest! Distinguishing between 
open and closed processes allows us to fend off liberalism, but what of 
the notion of a process itself? Our account is committed to the existence 
of real, distinct processes operating in development, some of which can 
be identified as the proximal causes of a given trait. W ithout such a 
commitment, the notion of a process could undermine our account from 
two directions: by being either overly narrow or overly broad.
Consider first the possibility of overly narrow construals of processes. 
Suppose that someone simply describes a process as follows: “the process 
that produced t, but no other traits.” For example, suppose that someone 
describes the process that happened to produce believing that water is 
wet and nothing else in an organism. If such a description is not empty, 
then the process so picked out would be very closed. And the trait would 
thus, on our account, be innate. Indeed, since every trait would enable 
such a description of a process, it would follow on our account that all 
traits are innate! But we deny that the description is satisfied. We deny 
that there is a process that produces the trait of believing that water is 
wet, but no other trait. Any substantive ontology of processes may ac­
knowledge the existence of learning in general,21 and important subtypes 
of learning, typed according to underlying sense modalities; or different 
mechanisms of conscious inference, tacit learning, and conditioning; or 
different storage architectures such as long-term memory, the lexicon, and 
so on. But none of these will turn out to be sufficiently belief specific as 
to count as a closed process whose sole output is believing that water is 
wet. And if it did turn out on close inspection that there was such a 
process that was dedicated to the production of that trait, then we would 
contend that the initial judgment that the trait is not innate should be 
revised.
One might worry that, in addition to ruling out overly specific ‘pro­
cesses’ that would make all traits the product of closed processes, we also 
must rule out the overly general construals of ‘process’ that would make 
all traits the product of open processes. Suppose that one could take all
(experience of the world) while the rationalist holds that such beliefs arise in some way 
from the mind itself. It is clear that this debate can be construed as depending on the 
openness of the process by which the trait is acquired.
21. Though we do not mean to wed our account to any particular story about processes, 
we note that the recent and popular Machamer, Darden, and Craver theory of mech­
anism is sufficiently robust to rule out these problem cases, since that theory includes 
an emphasis on the importance of regularity, nonaccidentality, and counterfactual 
support in the positing of activities (e.g., Machamer, Darden, and Craver 2000, 7).
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the processes that have been involved in Chomsky’s development and call 
that whole assemblage “Chomsky’s developmental process.” This will turn 
out to be an open process, since it would have given Chomsky different 
traits had he grown up with a different environment. And it might seem 
to follow, then, that none of Chomsky’s traits are innate, since there is 
some open process that has produced all of his traits! Call this the overly  
general process problem.
This worry is closely related to a worry commonly raised by opponents 
of the innateness concept. Opponents of the innateness concept, especially 
those influenced by Lehrman’s (1953) influential critique, are wont to 
emphasize that development is an enormously complex cascade of pro­
cesses, many of which may be open to environmental perturbations. Con­
sider one of the examples of an open process with which we have been 
working: ingestion. While we have suggested that ingestion is an open 
process that may result in wide range of traits, it is important to note 
that ingestion is also a causal prerequisite for the operation of virtually 
any paradigmatically innate process in humans. Similarly, the processes 
by which DNA causes the synthesis of particular proteins that in turn 
take part in other complex interactions giving rise to, for example, tissues 
and organs may have an enormous number of outcomes under environ­
mental perturbation, and so these processes would be open. W hat these 
examples seem to show is that if any open process in the developmental 
history of a trait makes that trait noninnate, almost no traits will be 
innate. Call this the openness in the causal history problem.22
While some might think that the solution here is to give up on the 
innateness concept, we think that the answer to both the overly general 
process problem and the openness in the causal history problem is to be 
found in insisting again on a robust ontology of processes. Tn response 
to overly general construals of processes, we need only insist that our 
condition ii be interpreted such that for t to be innate in O, it does not 
matter if som e open process has produced t in O. as long as there exists 
som e proximal cause of t that is a closed process. And similarly, openness 
in the causal chain leading to the development of t does not count against 
f s  being innate as long as the proximal cause of t is closed.
So, it seems that we are hanging our account on there being an objective 
way of individuating processes. As a general rule, for a process to count 
as a “real” process, there must be some criteria of individuation inde­
pendent of the trait or traits the process results in. For example, processes 
might be individuated by their evolutionary function or by the distinct
22. Indeed, DNA synthesis also raises the overly general process problem as it produces 
a rather large number of traits, many of which, like having A T P  syn th a se  in its cells, 
would be categorized as very innate in most organisms.
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physiological mechanism that underwrites them. In any case, we take it 
that scientific practice justifies our rejection of overly narrow and overly 
broad processes—they just are not the sort of things in which actual 
developmental biologists or psychologists have much interest. Moreover, 
at least Samuels relies on a robust distinction between processes to ground 
his account of innateness, so we are in good company in making this 
assumption. At a minimum, we are willing to grant that if, as a m atter 
of fact and at the end of the day, the notion of a real process fails to be 
scientifically respectable, then so too will the notion of innateness prove 
disreputable as well. But, in the meantime, in which the sciences are up 
to their Krebs cycles in processes, we take our ‘closed process invariantism’ 
account to provide a framework for discussing innateness that resolves 
the problem of liberalism.
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